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Brucker: Beyond Bostock: Title IX Protections for Transgender Athletes

BEYOND BOSTOCK: TITLE IX PROTECTIONS FOR
TRANSGENDER ATHLETES
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IT MEANS
ATHLETE

TO BE A

TRANSGENDER

“Gender” and “sex” are sometimes erroneously conflated and
used interchangeably, but in fact, the terms embody two distinct
concepts.1 Much of western society now distinguishes “sex,” referring to the physiological distinctions between male and female individuals based on anatomical and biological factors, from “gender,”
the socially constructed amalgam of behaviors, identities, and expressions of identity.2 While some individuals’ gender identities
1. See, e.g., Sex & Gender, NIH OFF. OF RSCH. ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://
orwh.od.nih.gov/sex-gender [https://perma.cc/V9X5-U49D] (last visited Nov. 6,
2021) (“ ‘Sex’ refers to biological differences between females and males, including chromosomes, sex organs, and endogenous hormonal profiles. ‘Gender’ refers
to socially constructed and enacted roles and behaviors which occur in a historical
and cultural context and vary across societies and over time.”); see also Virginia
Prince, Sex vs. Gender, 8:4 INT’L J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 29, 29 (2005) (“Sex and
gender are not the same thing. We are born into a society that is highly polarized
and highly stereotyped, not only into male and female, but into man and woman.
Man and male, female and woman are considered synonymous pairs of words for
the same thing . . . But it is not so. Sex and gender are not the same thing.”); Krista
Conger, Of Mice, Men and Women, STAN. MED. (Spring 2017), https://
stanmed.stanford.edu/2017spring/how-sex-and-gender-which-are-not-the-samething-influence-our-health.html [https://perma.cc/2LS4-2NE7] (explaining how
“gender” is often erroneously used by medical researchers instead of “sex”); Tim
Newman, Sex and Gender: What’s the Difference?, MED. NEWS TODAY (May 11, 2021),
www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/232363.php [https://perma.cc/5XEEFT5N] (describing shifting public perception of sex and perception of gender
over time while distinguishing between those terms).
2. See generally Gender and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., www.who.int/genderequity-rights/understanding/gender-definition/en/ [https://perma.cc/HKC4W37Z] (last visited Sep. 22, 2021) (elaborating on differences between sex versus
gender). See also What is Gender? What is Sex?, CANADIAN INST. OF HEALTH RSCH.,
https://cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/48642.html [https://perma.cc/A8UR-YZ6E] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2021) (“Gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, expressions and identities of girls, women, boys, men, and gender diverse people . . . .
Gender identity is not confined to a binary (girl/woman, boy/man) nor is it static;
it exists along a continuum and can change over time. There is considerable diversity in how individuals and groups understand, experience and express gender
through the roles they take on, the expectations placed on them, relations with
others and the complex ways that gender is institutionalized in society.”); What is
the Difference Between Sex and Gender?, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://
www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/articles/whatisthedifferencebetweensexandgender/2019-02-21 [https://perma.cc/S3SX-7NJT] (providing UK government’s definition of sex as referring to biological aspects of
individuals determined by anatomy and gender as social construction relating to
behaviors, and attributes based on masculinity or femininity).
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Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

1

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [], Art. 4

328

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 327

correspond with their biological sex, this is not always the case.3
Moreover, there is no commonly accepted definition of “sex” or
method for distinguishing between sexes, and not every definition
or method of sex determination consistently produces a clear,
male-female binary.4 In response to historical practices among various international sporting organizations that adopted so-called “objective” methods for rooting out “impostors” or intersex athletes,
some experts and activists have argued instead for more fluid definitions of sex determined not by any one set of physical features but
by a confluence of genetic, hormonal, and physiological factors.5
Ultimately, these experts assert that any purportedly objective test
or guideline claiming to accurately distinguish between male and
female athletes is inevitably flawed due to the inherently amorphous borders between sexes.6
3. See, e.g., Gender Identity, Gender-Based Violence and Human Rights, COUNCIL OF
EUR., https://rm.coe.int/chapter-1-gender-identity-gender-based-violence-andhuman-rights-gende/16809e1595 [https://perma.cc/R3SQ-RQ3H] (last visited
Nov. 4, 2021) (“Gender is not necessarily defined by biological sex: a person’s
gender may or may not correspond to their biological sex. Gender is more about
identity and how we feel about ourselves. People may self-identify as male, female,
transgender, other or none (indeterminate/unspecified). People that do not identify as male or female are often grouped under the umbrella terms ‘non-binary’ or
‘genderqueer’, but the range of gender identifications is in reality unlimited.”).
4. See J. Brad Reich, A (Not So) Simple Question: Does Title IX Encompass “Gender”?, 51 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 225, 227 (2018) (finding gonadic criteria based on
reproductive glands is not only factor upon which definition of biological gender
rests). Other definitions of sex include genetic sex based on X and Y chromosome
combinations, anatomical sex based on the appearance of the genitalia, and hormonal sex based on predominant hormones. See id. at 228 (providing overview of
various ways of defining “sex”). These commonly accepted methods of defining
sex do not lend themselves to neat categorizations of sex along a male-female binary. See id. at 227 (explaining chromosomal criteria make definition of sex more
nuanced). See generally Claire Ainsworth, Sex Redefined, 518 NATURE 288, 288–291
(Feb. 19, 2015) (“[I]f biologists continue to show that sex is a spectrum, then society and state will have to grapple with the consequences, and work out where and
how to draw the line . . . [I]f the law requires that a person is male or female,
should that sex be assigned by anatomy, hormones, cells or chromosomes, and
what should be done if they clash? . . . . If you want to know whether someone is
male or female, it may be best just to ask.”).
5. See Ruth Padawer, The Humiliating Practice of Sex-Testing Female Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/magazine/the-humiliating-practice-of-sex-testing-female-athletes.html [https://perma.cc/E7RE82E4] (explaining various factors forming basis for one’s sex, ways in which international sports organizations have attempted to define or distinguish sex over
time, various experts’ finding of criteria to be inadequate, unfair, not founded in
science); see also Christie Aschwanden, The Olympics Are Still Struggling to Define Gender, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 28, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/theolympics-are-still-struggling-to-define-gender/ [https://perma.cc/VM95-GNE3]
(describing debate over testosterone limits versus chromosomal tests for determining sex or use of gender identity, and tradeoffs of various approaches).
6. See Padawer, supra note 5 (“Relying on science to arbitrate the male-female
divide in sports is fruitless . . . because science could not draw a line that nature
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The increased visibility of transgender athletes and state laws
meant to curb their participation in athletics have placed issues of
sex and gender at the center of the larger legal, political, and cultural debate.7 Transgender (or “trans”) individuals are those whose
gender identity differs from the gender they were thought to be at
birth.8 An increasing number of high school and college-aged individuals are identifying as transgender, and these students and activists are challenging educators and lawmakers to rethink gender as
universally fixed at birth.9 While transgender individuals generally
have enjoyed increased visibility and acceptance in recent years, the
transgender community still faces obstacles in gaining access to
competitive sports.10 On July 14, 2021, for example, Texas passed
SB 2, a bill that would ban transgender women and girls from paritself refused to draw.”); see also Melonyce McAfee, Am I Not a Woman?, SLATE (Aug.
19, 2009), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/08/how-to-perform-a-gender-test.html [https://perma.cc/5WGW-2Z73] (describing some experts’ view of
futility of sex determination tests based on genetics or appearance of genitalia as
well as sordid history of tests employed by International Olympic Committee).
7. See generally Gillian R. Brassil & Jeré Longman, Who Should Compete in Women’s Sports? There are ‘Two Almost Irreconcilable Positions’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/sports/transgender-athletes-womenssports-idaho.html [https://perma.cc/6T72-F4QJ] (describing increased acceptance of transgender athletes amid increased resistance from some competitors,
some lawmakers).
8. See Frequently Asked Questions About Transgender People, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (July 19, 2016), http://www.transequality.org/issues/resources/
transgender-terminology [https://perma.cc/7L6A-2CU2] (defining basic terminology, commonly used acronyms); see also Jaclyn M. White Hughto et al., Transgender Stigma and Health: A Critical Review of Stigma Determinants, Mechanisms, and
Interventions, SOC. SCI. & MED. 147, 222–231 (2015) (finding transgender is umbrella term used to define individuals whose gender identity or expression differs
from culturally-bound gender associated with one’s assigned birth sex, is defined
by transgender individuals, is expressed in variety of ways); Megan Davidson, Seeking Refuge Under the Umbrella: Inclusion, Exclusion, and Organizing Within the Category
Transgender, 4 SEXUALITY RSCH. & SOC. POL’Y. 60, 60 (Dec. 2007) (finding “transgender” has no singular, fixed meaning but is largely held as inclusive of identities
or experiences of some or all gender-variant, gender or sex-changing, genderblending, gender-bending people).
9. See NCAA Inclusion of Transgender Student-Athletes, OFF. OF INCLUSION OF THE
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, Aug. 2011, at 1, 2 (providing guidance to
NCAA athletic programs on how to ensure transgender student-athletes fair, respectful, legal access to collegiate sports teams based on current medical, legal
knowledge); see also Model School District Policy on Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Students, NAT’L CENT. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (GLSEN), (Sept. 2018), at 1, 2
(providing education lobbying group’s model policy in which individuals determine gender identity for themselves, rejecting medical, legal, or other proof of
gender identity.
10. See Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for
Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 272 (2013) (providing background on struggles faced by transgender athletes).
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ticipating in sports consistent with their gender identity.11 In the
2020–21 legislative session alone, more than seventy-five bills were
introduced throughout the country that would bar transgender students from playing school sports on teams that conform with their
gender identity.12 Some proposals go so far as to suggest criminal
penalties if transgender athletes participate on teams consistent
with their gender identity.13 Notably, sixteen states have passed legislation banning transgender women and girls from participating
on teams that conform to their gender identity.14 Those in favor of
these laws often express fears that allowing transgender women and
girls to participate in high school and collegiate athletics will jeopardize the existence of women’s sports generally.15 Others believe
transgender participation in athletics does not spell an end to women’s sports but will actually enhance access to it.16
Moreover, the requisite gender “policing” procedures suggested by some state bills have been described by various international human rights organizations as both discriminatory and a
11. See Wyatt Ronan, Texas Senate Passes Anti-Transgender Sports Ban Bill, HUM.
RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 15, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/texas-senatepasses-anti-transgender-sports-ban-bill-2 [https://perma.cc/4BLG-QS9E] (detailing recent state action both within Texas, within other states, barring transgender
girls, women from participating on sports teams in conformity with their gender
identity).
12. See Dan Avery, Biden Administration Sends Trans Students a Back-to-School
Message, NBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-politics-and-policy/biden-administration-sends-trans-students-back-school-messagercna1724 [https://perma.cc/R6Q7-EER2] (describing largely positive response to
Biden Administration’s executive order by transgender activists).
13. See Elizabeth Sharrow et al., States Are Still Trying to Ban Trans Youths from
Sports. Here’s What You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Jul. 26, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/26/states-are-still-trying-ban-transyouths-sports-heres-what-you-need-know/ [https://perma.cc/BF8Q-AVB5] (highlighting number of state legislators with proposed bills targeting trans youths).
14. See K-12 Policies, TRANSATHLETE.COM, https://www.transathlete.com/k-12
[https://perma.cc/5VFG-J24C] (last visited Sep. 6, 2021) (listing states with laws
banning transgender students from participating in sports consistent with their
gender identity with temporary injunctions blocking enforcement in Idaho, West
Virginia).
15. See Abigail Shrier, Joe Biden’s First Day Began the End of Girls’ Sports, WALL
STREET J. (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/joe-bidens-first-day-beganthe-end-of-girls-sports-11611341066 [https://perma.cc/F6MF-HKU4] (arguing
President Biden’s January 20, 2021 Executive Order will result in stripping all Title
IX benefits away from women, girls).
16. See Statement from Women’s Rights and Gender Justice Organizations in Support
of the Equality Act, NOW (Mar. 17, 2021), https://now.org/media-center/press-release/statement-of-womens-rights-and-gender-justice-organizations-in-support-ofthe-equality-act/ [https://perma.cc/TS4J-U5N9] (“Girls and women who are
transgender should have the same opportunities as girls and women who are cisgender to enjoy the educational benefits of sports, such as higher grades, higher
graduation rates, and greater psychological well-being.”).
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violation of basic human rights.17 The National Collegiate Athletic
Association (“NCAA”) recognizes all stakeholders involved in collegiate sports benefit from fair and inclusive participation practices
enabling transgender student-athletes to participate on teams that
align with their gender identity.18 Yet, despite the strides transgender athletes have made in representation throughout the past
few decades, statutory protections under Title IX and the Department of Education’s policies have not always provided adequate
protections.19
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County20 appears to have set the stage to change this dynamic.21
This Comment reviews the legislative history and application of civil
rights legislation barring discrimination on the basis of sex, includ17. See They’re Chasing Us Away from Sport, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 4, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/12/04/theyre-chasing-us-away-sport/humanrights-violations-sex-testing-elite-women# [https://perma.cc/5KRA-KZUA] (stating
nearly century-long history of sex testing of women athletes at international level
represents human rights issue); see also Intersection of Race and Gender Discrimination
in Sport, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. COUNCIL (June 15, 2020), https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/44/26 [https://perma.cc/374U-NAJ3] (“The implementation of female eligibility regulations denies athletes with variations in sex
characteristics an equal right to participate in sports and violates the right to nondiscrimination more broadly.”).
18. See NCAA Inclusion of Transgender Student-Athletes, supra note 9, at 8 (“All
stakeholders in NCAA athletics programs will benefit from adopting fair and inclusive practices enabling transgender student-athletes to participate on school sports
teams. School-based sports, even at the most competitive levels, remain an integral
part of the process of education and development of young people, especially
emerging leaders in our society.”).
19. See, e.g., Anagha Srikanth, Taylor Small Becomes Vermont’s First Transgender
Legislator, HILL (Nov. 4, 2020), https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/diversity-inclusion/524512-taylor-small-becomes-vermonts-first-transgender [https://
perma.cc/LUR8-JR9Q] (discussing Vermont’s first transgender legislator and implications of groundbreaking victory for future LGBTQ legislators); see also Laurel
Hubbard: First Transgender Athlete to Compete at Olympics, BBC (June 21, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57549653 [https://perma.cc/AB22VWM5] (discussing first transgender athlete to compete at Olympics, including
public’s reaction); Caitlin O’Kane, Chris Mosier, First Openly Transgender Athlete on
Team USA, Hopes Sharing His Story Inspires Others, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/chris-mosier-transgender-olympic-athlete-team-usa-sharing-story/ [https://perma.cc/6BAB-LH8X] (interviewing first transgender male
athlete to represent United States in international competition, prompting International Olympic Committee to change policy on transgender athletes). See generally Maya Satya Reddy, The Weaponization of Title IX in Sports, REGULATORY REV.
(June 29, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/06/29/reddy-weaponization-of-title-ix-sports/ [https://perma.cc/G9DW-4DRV] (describing ways in which
Title IX enforcement can reinforce prevailing views of masculinity and gender
stereotypes).
20. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1734, (2020).
21. For further discussion of Bostock’s future impact on Title IX legislation,
see infra notes 70–156 and accompanying text.
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ing Title IX and its corollary in the employment realm, Title VII.22
Moreover, this Comment shows that recent legislation at the state
level is destined to fail given recent Title IX challenges bolstered by
the Bostock decision as well as potential constitutional arguments
against these laws.23 This Comment also discusses what the Bostock
decision implies for women’s sports generally going forward and
shows that, despite the pessimistic predictions of some commentators, the future of women’s sports is not being threatened by transgender athletes.24 Section II discusses Title IX and guidance
provided by the Department of Education relating to the law’s application to transgender students.25 The Comment then examines
the approach taken by various federal courts to Title IX and competing legal theories for its application.26 Finally, the Comment explores recent state legislation regarding transgender athletes that
have brought this issue to the fore.27 Section III shows that this
state level legislation is ultimately destined to be overturned on
challenge under Title IX, bolstered by equal protection challenges,
and what the inevitable inclusion of transgender athletes means for
women’s athletics going forward.28
II. BACKGROUND: CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
ATHLETES

AND

TRANSGENDER

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was signed into
law on June 23, 1972 by President Richard Nixon.29 The statute
itself provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro22. For further discussion of how Title IX and Title IV relate, see infra notes
70–156 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of implications for recent legislation at the state
level, see infra notes 158–170 and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of the impact of Bostock on women’s sports generally, see infra notes 188–200 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the Department of Education’s guidance on Title IX application, see infra notes 44–69 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of the competing legal theories of Title IX’s application, see infra notes 81–118 and accompanying text.
27. For further discussion of the recent state legislation either banning transgender athletes or enabling their participation, see infra notes 120–132 and accompanying text.
28. For further discussion of the implication of recent court developments on
women’s sports generally, see infra notes 188–200 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Margaret E. Juliano, Forty Years of Title IX: History and New Applications, 14 Del. L. Rev. 83, 83 (2013) (providing overview of history and future of
Title IX).
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gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”30 Title IX
was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Where
Title VI protects against race discrimination in all programs receiving federal funds, Title IX protects against sex discrimination and
applies only to educational programs.32 The U.S. Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has since provided additional direction in the form of memorandums, “Dear Colleague”
letters, clarifications, and other various guidance extending Title IX
protections to athletics at educational institutions.33
A. Title IX and Competing Guidance from the
Department of Education
On October 26, 2010, under the Obama administration, the
OCR released a “Dear Colleague” letter stating that “Title IX does
protect all students, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students, from sex discrimination.”34 In an opinion letter dated January 7, 2015, the OCR elaborated further by
stating that the portion of Title IX providing for separate bathroom
and locker room facilities on the basis of sex should be applied to
transgender students consistent with their gender identity.35 In July
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (emphasis added).
31. See Overview of Title IX: Interplay with Title VI, Section 504, Title VII, and the
Fourteenth Amendment, JUSTIA (last visited Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.justia.com/
education/docs/title-ix-legal-manual/overview-of-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/
ZHN8-2D8V] (describing Congress’s conscious effort to model Title IX on Title VI
of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
32. See generally Ann K. Wooster, Sex discrimination in Public Education Under
Title IX — Supreme Court Cases, 158 A.L.R. Fed. 563 (1999) (describing how Title IX
was designed, and how school receiving federal funds remain in compliance).
33. See Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review
of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
325, 333 (2012) (describing mechanisms through which Title IX has been enforced including its application to athletic programs).
34. See Ruslynn Ali, Asst. Secretary for Civil Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear
Colleague Letter (Oct. 26, 2010), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201010.html [https://perma.cc/YU87-JLFQ] [hereinafter 2010
Dear Colleague Letter] (providing Obama administration policy toward LGBT
students).
35. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2022) (providing in part “a recipient [of federal
funds] may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis
of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to
such facilities provided for students of the other sex”); see also Letter from James A.
Ferg-Cadima, Acting Deputy to Asst. Secretary for Policy, Office for Civil Rights, to
Emily Prince, Esqu. (Jan. 7, 2015) available at: http://www.bricker.com/documents/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_1-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S2XG-UNUZ] (“When a school elects to separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity.”); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch.
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of that same year, the Department of Justice and OCR approved the
nondiscrimination policy of Arcadia Unified School District, created in response to a Title IX complaint filed by a transgender student in that district.36 Finally, on May 13, 2016, OCR released an
additional “Dear Colleague” letter stating that departments should
treat a student’s gender identity the same as a student’s sex for purposes of Title IX and its implementing regulations.37 Regarding
athletics, this letter stated that while a school may operate sex-segregated athletic teams when such selection is based on competitive
skill or when the activity involved is a contact sport, schools may not
“adopt or adhere to requirements that rely on overly broad generalizations or stereotypes about the differences between transgender
students and other students of the same sex (i.e., the same gender
identity) or others’ discomfort with transgender students.”38
On February 22, 2017, following the election of President Donald J. Trump, the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice issued
a joint letter withdrawing the guidance of the 2016 “Dear Colleague” letter.39 In an internal memo, the OCR was advised to rely
Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Grimm I] (finding U.S. Department of Education entitled to Auer deference in interpreting 34 C.F.R. § 106.33).
36. See KAREN J. LANGSLEY & SHELLY L. SKEEN, TRANSGENDER ISSUES (TX. C.L.E.
ADVANCED FAM. L. 12.2, 2016) (providing background on nondiscrimination policy
for transgender students adopted by Arcadia Unified School District); see also
David Vannasdall, Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist., Transgender Students — Ensuring Equity
and Nondiscrimination, ARCADIA UNIFIED SCH. DIST. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://
www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Transgender-Policy-Bulletin-Approved-w-corrections-April-2015.pdf [[https://perma.cc/HW8T-FU6X] (providing
Arcadia Unified School District policy regarding issues relating to transgender
students).
37. See U.S. Departments of Justice and Education Release Joint Guidance to Help
Schools Ensure the Civil Rights of Transgender Students, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 13,
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-departments-justice-and-education-release-joint-guidance-help-schools-ensure-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/TUR33F8C] (“The guidance makes clear that both federal agencies treat a student’s
gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of enforcing Title IX.”); see also
Catherine E. Lhamon, Asst. Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Vanita
Gupta, Principal Deputy Asst. Attorney General for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N2A-VF2J] [hereinafter 2016 Dear Colleague Letter]
(“This means that a school must not treat a transgender student differently from
the way it treats other students of the same gender identity.”).
38. See id. at 3 (finding under Title IX, schools must treat students consistent
with gender identity despite contrary education records, identification
documents).
39. See Sandra Battle, Acting Asst. Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ. & T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.docx [https://perma.cc/7CKJ-T8SP]
[hereinafter 2017 Dear Colleague Letter] (noting withdrawal of guidance documents
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solely on Title IX and its implementing regulations as interpreted
by federal courts and remaining OCR guidance documents in evaluating complaints of sex discrimination against individuals.40 Department enforcement of Title IX protections for transgender
athletes once again shifted following the election of President Joseph Biden.41 The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice issued a memo to federal agencies reestablishing protections
for gay and transgender students under Title IX.42 This memo returned to the Department of Education policies followed under
President Obama, bolstered by legal arguments following Bostock.43
B. Recent Federal Court Cases and Regulatory Developments:
Circuit courts currently appear on the brink of a split over the
rights of transgender students, and the Supreme Court has thus far
refused to take up the issue.44 Understandably, the unresolved ledid not leave students without protections from discrimination, bullying or harassment as OCR would continue to hear all claims of discrimination).
40. See Candice Jackson, Acting Asst. Secretary for Civil Rights, Office for Civil
Rights, Dep’t of Educ., OCR Instruction to the Field re Complaints Involving Transgender
Students (June 6, 2017), https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3866816/
OCR-Instructions-to-the-Field-Re-Transgender.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJN6H5SH] [hereinafter OCR Instruction] (reiterating withdrawal from Obama Administration guidance documents does not leave students without protections, OCR
should rely on Title IX, Department regulations, in evaluating complaints of sex
discrimination against individuals whether or not individual is transgender).
41. See Avery, supra note 12 (describing new approach taken by Biden Administration in enforcing Title IX).
42. See Marking the One-Year Anniversary of Bostock With Pride, OFF. FOR CIV. RTS.
(June 16, 2021), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/blog/
20210616.html [https://perma.cc/AQ94-8J3F] (“In Bostock, the Supreme Court
recognized that ‘it is impossible to discriminate against a person’ because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity ‘without discriminating against that individual based on sex.’ That reasoning should—and does—apply regardless of whether
the individual is an adult in a workplace or a student in school . . . [O]CR affirms
our commitment to guaranteeing all students—including those who identify as
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+)—an educational environment free from discrimination.”).
43. See id. (issuing Notice of Interpretation enforcing Title IX’s prohibition
on sex discrimination to include discrimination based on gender identity consistent with reasoning in Bostock).
44. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Grimm, 141 S. Ct. 2878, 2878 (2021)
(mem.) (denying writ of certiorari, leaving in place Fourth Circuit ruling that
Gloucester County School Board acted unlawfully by preventing transgender boy
from using boy’s bathroom); see also Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 141 S. Ct. 894, 894
(mem.) (2020) (denying writ of certiorari, leaving in place Ninth Circuit ruling
that policy allowing transgender students to use bathrooms, locker rooms, showers
matching gender identity rather than biological sex assigned at birth does not violate Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy or create hostile environment or discrimination claim actionable via Title IX); Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 139 S.
Ct. 2636, (mem.) (2019) (denying writ of certiorari, leaving in place Third Circuit
decision to uphold Pennsylvania school district policy allowing transgender stu-
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gal questions surrounding transgender students’ rights have resulted in myriad school policies and state laws throughout the
country.45 Idaho was the first state to pass a law preventing transgender women from participating in women’s sports.46 The law
never went into effect as there was an injunction followed by a
Ninth Circuit appeal.47 In Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,48
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the first
federal court to rule in favor of the right of transgender students to
use bathrooms corresponding with their gender identity.49 In this
case, a transgender student claimed that the use of “alternative pridents to use bathrooms that conform to gender identity); Whitaker v. Kenosha
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1055 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding
transgender students protected from discrimination under Title IX, Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). But see Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns
Cty., 9 F.4th 1369, 1372 (11th Cir. 2021) (ordering panel’s previous opinion that
district’s policy barring transgender student from using boys’ restroom violated
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection will be reheard en banc,
then vacating panel’s opinion); see also Jo Yurcaba, Supreme Court Could Hear Transgender Student Bathroom Case, Experts Say, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2021), https://
www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-news/supreme-court-hear-transgender-studentbathroom-case-experts-say-rcna1797 [https://perma.cc/HGH5-LK9P] (citing experts stating Eleventh Circuit likely to find in favor of school district creating split
in circuit courts over transgender bathroom access); see also Soule by Stanescu v.
Connecticut Ass’n of Sch., Inc., No. 3:20-CV-00201 (RNC), 2021 WL 1617206, at *1
(D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2021) (rejecting potential challenge to Connecticut trans-inclusive laws).
45. See, e.g., Sonali Kohli, How California Protects Trangender Students, L.A.
TIMES (May 17, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-transgender-student-rights-20160516-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/D7WDLGA6] (describing various pro-transgender student policies throughout State of
California); see also, e.g., 2012–13 Case Studies, ALA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N,
http://media.wix.com/ugd/2bc3fc_87536da66cad4d6195ae056a573e67da.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8S3-J853] (last visited Sept. 6, 2021) (“[P]articipation in athletics should be determined by the gender indicated on the student-athlete’s certified certificate of birth.”). See generally K-12 Policies, supra note 14 (providing
overview of disparate state, school district policies toward transgender student
athletes).
46. See Talya Minsberg, Boys Are Boys and Girls Are Girls: Idaho Is First State to Bar
Some Transgender Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/01/sports/transgender-idaho-ban-sports.html [https://perma.cc/V3WZEJFA] (describing Idaho as first state in United States to bar transgender girls from
participating in girls’ or women’s sports, first to legalize practice of sex testing in
order to compete).
47. See All Women and Girls Can Now Try Out For Fall Teams, AM. C. L. UNION
(Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/judge-blocks-first-law-targeting-transgender-athletes-case-continues [https://perma.cc/4R3F-SKG5] (describing ACLU’s successful efforts to block Idaho’s law targeting transgender student
athletes).
48. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 619 (4th Cir. 2020)
[hereinafter Grimm II].
49. See id. (holding Board’s application of its restroom policy against Grimm
violated Title IX).
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vate” restroom facilities rather than communal restrooms violated
Title IX and equal protection guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment.50 The case was initially granted certiorari by the U.S.
Supreme Court but was later remanded back to the Fourth Circuit
when federal guidelines were withdrawn by the Trump administration in 2017.51
The Third and Ninth Circuits have rejected invasion of privacy
claims filed on behalf of non-transgender students that intended to
challenge policies that explicitly permit transgender students to use
bathrooms that correspond with their gender identity.52 In Doe v.
Boyertown Area School District,53 the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court’s decision to deny a preliminary injunction against the school
district’s policy allowing transgender students to use locker rooms
that conform to their gender identity.54 The court based its decision on the state’s “compelling interest in not discriminating
against transgender students.”55 Likewise, students in this case
brought a Title IX claim, which the Third Circuit rejected because
the school district’s policy allowed all students to use bathrooms
and locker rooms that aligned with their gender identity, and thus
“[did] not discriminate based on sex.”56 Therefore the court found
50. See id. at 709 (holding Board’s policy does not satisfy heightened scrutiny
because it is not substantially related to its important interest in protecting students’ privacy).
51. See Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239, 1239
(2017) (mem.) (holding Fourth Circuit’s “[j]udgment [is] vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further
consideration in light of guidance document issued by Department of Education
and Department of Justice on February 22, 2017”).
52. See Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1225 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Plaintiffs fail to show that the contours of the privacy right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are so broad as to protect against the District’s implementation of the
Student Safety Plan. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Student
Safety Plan provides alternative options and privacy protections to those who do
not want to share facilities with a transgender student, even though those alternative options admittedly appear inferior and less convenient.”); see also Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 538 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting “a person has a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body,” but
rejecting appellant argument privacy rights violated by school district policy allowing transgender students access to “bathrooms and locker rooms that aligned
with their gender identities”).
53. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018).
54. See id. at 538 (denying preliminary injunction against Pennsylvania school
districts policy allowing transgender athletes to play on teams in conformity with
gender identity).
55. See id. at 526 (“The District Court correctly concluded that the appellants’
constitutional right to privacy claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits.”).
56. See id. at 533 (“The District Court correctly concluded that the appellants’
Title IX claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits.”).
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that school policy allowing transgender students to use facilities
that conform with their gender identity did not violate Title IX.57
In Soule v. Connecticut Ass’n of Schools,58 non-transgender student athletes challenged a Connecticut state policy allowing transgender
students to compete in girls’ high school sports.59 This case was
ultimately dismissed for mootness since the plaintiffs had graduated
and were no longer eligible to compete, but the case is currently on
appeal before the Second Circuit.60 Finally, in Adams v. School Board
of St. Johns County61 a three-judge panel for the Eleventh Circuit
held that barring a transgender student from using the restroom
that conforms with their gender identity violates the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection.62 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately
vacated this ruling and will now review the case en banc.63 Some
have speculated that the Eleventh Circuit will likely split with other
circuits who have unanimously upheld trans-inclusive school policies against challenge and protected transgender student’s access to
facilities that conform with their gender identity.64
While circuit courts have been addressing the applicability of
Title IX and gender identity at school, on June 15, 2020, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its watershed Bostock decision holding that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in
the workplace based on sexual orientation or gender identity.65 In
57. See id. at 535 (holding school district’s policy allowing transgender students to compete on teams conforming to gender identity does not discriminate
based on sex or violate Title IX).
58. Soule v. Conn. Ass’n of Schools, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-00201(RNC), 2021 WL
1617206 (D Conn., Apr. 25, 2021).
59. See id. at *1 (“This case involves a challenge to the transgender participation policy of the Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (“CIAC”), the
governing body for interscholastic athletics in Connecticut, which permits
high school students to participate in sex-segregated sports consistent with their
gender identity.”).
60. See id. at *4 (“Plaintiffs correctly argue that the issue is one of mootness
rather than standing.”); see also Soule by Stanescu v. Conn. Ass’n of Sch., Inc., No.
3:20-CV-00201 (RNC), 2021 WL 1617206, at *1 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2021) (providing appellants opening brief requesting reversal of district court’s order, accusing
district judge of bias).
61. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 9 F.4th 1369 (11th Cir. 2021) (mem.).
62. See Soule by Stanescu, No. 3:20-CV-00201 (RNC), 2021 WL 1617206, at
*15 (stating arbitrariness of school’s policy does not pass heightened scrutiny as it
targets transgender students for restrictions but not other students, including district failure to demonstrate substantial, accurate relationship between sex classification with policy’s stated purpose).
63. See Adams, 9 F.4th at 1372 (ordering case be reheard en banc).
64. See Yurcaba, supra note 44 (describing potential split among circuit courts
on treatment of transgender student rights under Title IX).
65. See Lawrence Hurley, In Landmark Ruling, Supreme Court Bars Discrimination
Against LGBT Workers, REUTERS (June 15, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/
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Bostock, the U.S. Supreme Court heard three consolidated cases involving LGBTQ employees who had been dismissed because of
their LGBTQ status: (1) Bostock v. Clayton County II,66 (2) Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc.,67 and (3) EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc.68 The same week this case was decided, President Biden
issued an Executive Order asserting that “[a]ll persons should receive equal treatment under the law, no matter their gender identity or sexual orientation.”69
C. Bostock’s Impact on the LGBTQ Community Generally
The majority in Bostock referred to Title VII’s protections
against discrimination on the basis of sex as “simple but momentous.”70 Bostock settled the major legal questions regarding LGBTQ
employees and Title VII protections, but questions regarding exactly how far the Bostock decision extends still remain to be determined.71 In addition to Title VII and Title IX, sex discrimination is
prohibited by several other federal statutes including the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the Fair Housing Act.72 Questions remain about Bostock’s implication for these statutes.73 Regardless, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock will certainly have
a wide-ranging impact on the LGBTQ community generally.74 The
us-usa-court-lgbt/in-landmark-ruling-supreme-court-bars-discrimination-againstlgbt-workers-idUSKBN23M20N [https://perma.cc/KK55-BCGF] (summarizing
Bostock decision including implications for transgender people).
66. No. 1:16-CV-001460-ODE-WEJ, 2016 WL 9753356 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 3, 2016).
67. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
68. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S.
Ct. 1731, 1731 (2020) (discussing consolidated cases as part of Bostock decision).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,988, 86 C.F.R. § 7023 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“Under Bostock’s reasoning, laws that prohibit sex discrimination . . . prohibit discrimination
on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation so long as the laws do not
contain sufficient indications to the contrary.”).
70. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“The statute’s message for our cases is
equally simple and momentous: An individual’s homosexuality or transgender status is not relevant to employment decisions. That’s because it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.”).
71. See id. at 1753 (“Whether other policies and practices might or might not
qualify as unlawful discrimination or find justifications under other provisions of
Title VII are questions for future cases.”).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012) (prohibiting creditors from discriminating
against applicant on the basis of sex); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (prohibiting
sex discrimination in “the sale or rental of housing”).
73. For further discussion of Bostock’s impact on other civil rights laws, see
infra note 74 and accompanying text.
74. See generally Amanda Hainsworth, Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590
U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), BOS. B.J. 3, 22, 23 (2020) (describing anticipated
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most immediate impact will likely be within states without preexisting employment discrimination protections for members of the
LGBTQ community.75 The decision appears to provide an immediate remedy for discrimination within the realm of employment.76
Justice Alito in his Bostock dissent stated that the problem with
the Court’s majority decision is most acute in its implication for
schools and religious institutions.77 Moreover, Justice Alito argued
that Bostock could infringe on free speech rights if employers refused to use transgender employees’ chosen names and pronouns.78 In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh states that he disagrees
with the majority regarding the original meaning of the statutory
language of Title VII, but recognized the important victory the majority’s decision represents for “gay and lesbian Americans.”79 The
Majority asserted that, while those who originally adopted the Civil
Rights Act might not have anticipated their work leading to this
particular result, “the limits of the drafters’ imagination supply no
reason to ignore the law’s demands.”80

litigation related to interplay between federal civil rights laws, employers religious
beliefs, additional protections for LGBTQ individuals beyond state nondiscrimination laws, federal equal protection claims involving discrimination against LGBTQ
individuals).
75. See generally id. (describing Bostock’s effects on federal law).
76. For further discussion of Bostock’s impact in the employment realm, see
infra note 83 and accompanying text.
77. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1781 (2020) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“This problem is perhaps most acute when it comes to the employment of teachers. A school’s standards for its faculty ‘communicate a particular
way of life to its students,’ and a ‘violation by the faculty of those precepts’ may
undermine the school’s ‘moral teaching.’ Thus, if a religious school teaches that
sex outside marriage and sex reassignment procedures are immoral, the message
may be lost if the school employs a teacher who is in a same-sex relationship or has
undergone or is undergoing sex reassignment. Yet today’s decision may lead to
Title VII claims by such teachers and applicants for employment.” (footnote
omitted)).
78. See id. at 1782 (“The position that the Court now adopts will threaten
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and personal privacy and safety.”).
79. See id. at 1837 (“Notwithstanding my concern about the Court’s transgression of the Constitution’s separation of powers, it is appropriate to acknowledge
the important victory achieved today by gay and lesbian Americans.”).
80. See id. at 1737 (“When the express terms of a statute give us one answer
and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written
word is the law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
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D. Title IX’s Purpose and Theories on Application
to Transgender Individuals
The original intent of Title IX was to “remedy to some extent
sex discrimination in education.”81 The Supreme Court has held
that Title IX broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting
any person to disparate treatment “on the basis of sex” including
sexual harassment or retaliating against one who complains about
sexual discrimination.82 During the drafting of Title IX, some
feared that the Act would mandate gender-mixed sports teams or
would otherwise negatively impact men’s access to collegiate
sports.83 In response, Senator Bayh stated that the intent of the law
was to “provide equal access for women and men students to the
educational process and extracurricular activities in school” and
not to “desegregate” the men’s locker room.84 Moreover, subsequent implementing regulations allow schools to “operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for
such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is
a contact sport.”85 While no language within the law provides a direct connection between Title IX and athletics, the legislative history and early case law demonstrate that athletics is a vital and

81. Trustees of Univ. of Del. V. Gebelein, 420 A.2d 1191, 1196 (Del. Ch.
1980).
82. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (“We
consider here whether the private right of action implied by Title IX encompasses
claims of retaliation. We hold that it does where the funding recipient retaliates
against an individual because he has complained about sex discrimination.”).
83. See Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review
of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 Marq. Sports L. Rev.
325, 333 (2012) (describing fears of some during drafting of Title IX that it would
mandate gender-mixed athletic teams); see also Doriane Lambelet Coleman et al.,
Re-Affirming the Value of the Sports Exception to Title IX’s General Non-Discrimination
Rule, 27 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 69, 72-73 (2020) (describing aftermath of
bill’s passage including efforts by those who feared Title IX would hinder men’s
revenue-producing sports such as football).
84. See 117 Cong. Rec. 30407 (Sep. 8, 1971) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh)
(“I do not read this as requiring integration of dormitories between the sexes, nor
do I feel it mandates the desegregation of football fields. What we are trying to do
is provide equal access for women and men students to the educational process
and the extracurricular activities in a school, where there is not a unique facet such
as football involved. We are not requiring that intercollegiate football be desegregated, nor that the men’s locker room be desegregated.”); see also Lambelet Coleman, supra note 83, 77–78 no. 40 (describing Senator Bayh’s assurances Title IX
would not require women play on football teams, elaborating on origins of “sports
exception” of Title IX).
85. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2020).
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important part of the educational experience for high school and
college students.86
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
IX, a student must allege that: (1) he or she was “subjected to discrimination in an educational program”; (2) “the program receives
federal assistance”; and (3) the discrimination “was on the basis of
sex.”87 While Title IX’s implementing regulations bar discrimination on the basis of sex, they also permit schools to operate separate
teams for members of each sex in certain circumstances.88 Various
federal courts have recognized that cases interpreting Title VII’s
provisions are relevant to and can be useful in analysis of claims of
Title IX discrimination.89
In early employment discrimination decisions involving the
“because of sex” provisions of Title VII, courts have held that Congress intended “sex” to mean biological sex as traditionally understood, denying Title VII protections for transgender individuals and
individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation, and even denying Title VII protections for pregnant women.90 Beginning in the
86. See Anderson, supra note 83 (explaining importance of athletics in Title
IX legislative history); see also Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1298
(8th Cir. 1973) (“Discrimination in high school interscholastic athletics constitutes
discrimination in education.”). See generally History of Title IX, WOMEN’S SPORTS
FOUND. (Aug, 13, 2019), https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/advocacy/history-of-title-ix/ [https://perma.cc/G9U3-RWHZ] (providing comprehensive overview of legislative history, including subsequent regulatory developments of Title
IX).
87. See Bougher v. Univ. of Pitt., 713 F. Supp. 139, 144 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (establishing prima facie case of discrimination under Title IX).
88. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1980) (“No person shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient [of federal
funds], and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.”); see also id § 106.41(b) (implementing regulations also permit schools to “operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such
teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport”).
89. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections
for Transgender Student Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 271, 283 (2013) (“Title
VII, which prohibits sex discrimination in employment, has been applied regularly
to claims of discrimination brought by transgender plaintiffs. Courts generally recognize that cases interpreting Title VII’s provisions are relevant to and can be imported into analysis of Title IX.”); see also Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 250
n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding “it is now established that the Title IX term ‘on the
basis of sex’ is interpreted in the same manner as similar language in Title VII”).
90. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding Title VII, including its legislative history subsequent to passage,
indicates Congress intended “sex” to be understood traditionally to “place women
on an equal footing with men” while denying protection to “transsexual” woman
alleging she was terminated on basis of sex); see also De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel.
Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Giving [Title VII] its plain meaning, this

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss2/4

16

Brucker: Beyond Bostock: Title IX Protections for Transgender Athletes

2022]

BEYOND BOSTOCK

343

1970s and 1980s, a series of Supreme Court cases expanded the
meaning of “because of sex” to encompass protections against sexual harassment, discrimination against men, and discrimination
based on women’s familial status.91 In 1984, the plaintiffs in Ulane
v. Eastern Airlines92 again tried to expand Title VII’s protections
against discrimination “because of sex” to transgender individuals,
but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected their argument,
holding that the plaintiff’s transition did not change their biological sex and therefore, their employer did not discriminate “because
of sex.”93 Five years later, the Supreme Court did expand the
meaning of “because of sex” in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins94 by holding that that Title VII prohibited discrimination against individuals
based on “sex stereotyping” or non-conformance with perceived
gender expectations.95 Courts have since typically considered discrimination against transgender individuals under two legal theories: (1) sex or gender stereotyping via Price Waterhouse or (2)
discrimination on the basis of gender identity constituting per se
discrimination “on the basis of sex.”96 Courts have therefore found
court concludes that Congress had only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind.”
(quoting Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662–63)); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936,
938 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal of employee’s Title VII claim alleging he
was fired because of sexual orientation); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
128 (1976) (holding employer’s disability benefits plan that fails to cover pregnancy-related disabilities does not violate Title VII). See generally Erin Buzuvis, “On
the Basis of Sex”: Using Title IX to Protect Transgender Students from Discrimination in
Education, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 219, 229 (2013) (providing early history of
Title VII cases including Title VII’s influence on Title IX cases).
91. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (“Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex.”); see also
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n,
462 U.S. 669, 685 (1983) (holding health benefits plan providing greater pregnancy-related coverage to female employees than spouses of male employees constitutes discrimination against male employees on basis of sex under Title VII);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (“Section 703 (a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore
erred in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men — each having pre-school-age children.”).
92. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
93. See id. (finding Ulane’s transition did not change her biological sex, therefore airline did not fire her “because of sex”).
94. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
95. See id. at 231–32 (finding in favor of female employee who sued employer
for discrimination on basis of sex under Title VII after coworkers said her chances
of making partner would be greater if she acted more feminine).
96. See Vittoria L. Buzzelli, Transforming Transgender Rights in Schools: Protection
from Discrimination Under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, 121 Penn St. L. Rev.
187, 193 (2016) (“Under Title VII, most courts have found that transgender peo-
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that discrimination “because of sex” potentially includes not just
discrimination based on one’s “biological” sex, but also discrimination on the basis of how one presents one’s gender relative to “biological” sex and the stereotypes associated with that sex.97 Prior to
Bostock, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits had held that discrimination based on sex stereotypes and per se discrimination based on
expressed gender identity were actionable under Title VII.98 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) similarly
found prior to Bostock in 2012 that sex, as used in Title VII, encompassed both sex and gender.99
ple are protected only on the basis of sex stereotyping, not because they are a
protected class per se.”).
97. See Buzuvis, supra note 90 (describing evolution of interpretations of Title
VII’s “because of sex” provision throughout lower courts, including Title VII’s influence on Title IX).
98. See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Sex
stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as
‘transsexual,’ is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity”). But see Glenn
v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A person is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses
gender stereotypes. ‘[T]he very acts that define transgender people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance
and behavior.’ ” (quoting Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 561, 563 (2007))); see also Ilona M. Turner, Sex
Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 562
(2007) (explaining Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio is first time federal court extended
Price Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory to transgender individuals, explaining
Eleventh Circuit in Brumby found discrimination based on expressed gender identity to be per se discrimination under Title VII).
99. See Macy v. Holder, EEOC DOC 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11
(Apr. 20, 2012) (“[W]e conclude that intentional discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title VII.”). The
court explained that a transgender person who experiences discrimination based
on their gender identity may establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination
through a number of different formulas. See id. at *15 (explaining different formulas by which transgender person may prove prima facie case of sex discrimination). A complainant may, for example establish a case of sex discrimination
under a theory of gender stereotyping wherein, for example, an employer believing that biological men must present as men and wear male clothing fires an employee for being insufficiently masculine. See id. (providing prima facie case of sex
discrimination established by sex stereotyping). Alternatively, a complainant could
prove they were discriminated against if an employer was willing to hire them
when they thought they were one gender but is unwilling to hire them when they
find out they are another gender. See id. at *32. (providing prima facie case of sex
discrimination established by per se discrimination). The commissioner compares
gender to religion in this respect; for purposes of establishing a prima facie case
that Title VII has been violated, employees must demonstrate only that an employer impermissibly used religion (or gender) in making employment decisions.
See id. at *31–33 (comparing gender-based and religion-based discrimination in
hiring).
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1. Sex Stereotyping and Title IX
The Price Waterhouse gender stereotyping interpretation has
proven influential in Title IX cases.100 Cases involving plaintiffs
targeted for their perceived gender presentation and sexual orientation have applied Title VII sex-stereotype precedents in analyzing
Title IX claims.101 A “Dear Colleague” letter released in 2010 stated
that Title IX does not expressly cover discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity, but it does protect students
who experience sex- or gender-based harassment.102 Before and after Bostock, Circuit Courts have applied Title VII reasoning to Title
IX cases involving gender identity discrimination in schools.103
Some courts have held that protections against discrimination
based on gender stereotypes may provide the most straight-forward
route to protecting transgender students facing similar harassment
in the future.104 The Eleventh Circuit suggested in Glenn v.
Brumby105 that considerations of gender stereotypes will inevitably
100. For further discussion of sex stereotyping as applied in the context of
Title IX, see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
101. See e.g., Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91
(D. Minn. 2000) (“Although no court has addressed this issue in the context of a
Title IX claim, several courts have considered whether same-sex harassment targeting the claimant’s failure to meet expected gender stereotypes is actionable under
Title VII. The Court looks to these precedents in analyzing plaintiff’s Title IX
claim, noting that Title VII similarly requires that the discrimination resulting in
the plaintiff’s claims be based on his or her sex . . . The Court for these reasons
concludes that by pleading facts from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer
that he suffered harassment due to his failure to meet masculine stereotypes, plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim under Title IX.” (citation omitted)); see also Doe
v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580–81 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding harassment
because Plaintiff did not conform to stereotypical expectations of masculinity was
actionable discrimination “because of sex”).
102. See 2010 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 34 (“Although Title IX does not
prohibit discrimination based solely on sexual orientation, Title IX does protect all
students, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) students, from
sex discrimination.”).
103. See Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845 F.3d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“Under settled law in this Circuit, gender nonconformity, as defined in Smith v.
City of Salem, is an individual’s ‘fail[ure] to act and/or identify with his or her
gender. . . . Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior
is impermissible discrimination.’ ” (quoting 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004))); see
also Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049
(7th Cir. 2017) (finding policy requiring individual to use bathroom that does not
conform with his or her gender identity punishes that individual for their gender
non-conformance, so it violates Title IX); Grimm II, 972 F. Supp. 3d 586, 616 (4th
Cir. 2020) (finding after Bostock its Title VII interpretation guides court’s Title IX
evaluation, so sex stereotyping constitutes sex-based discrimination under Equal
Protection clause).
104. For further discussion of sex-stereotyping and its application to Title IX,
see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
105. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011)
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be part of what drives discrimination against a transgender individual.106 Moreover, some commentators have argued that sex stereotyping may allow plaintiffs to take advantage of widely recognized
legal doctrine throughout various circuit courts, but it is potentially
problematic in that it forces transgender individuals to focus on
their gender nonconformity.107 “To recover for discrimination
claims based on supposed gender-nonconforming conduct, as set
forth in Price Waterhouse, transsexual plaintiffs must identify themselves as their their biological sex . . .” rather than the gender to
which they currently identify.108 Moreover, this approach counterproductively seeks to reject discrimination on the basis of harmful
gender stereotypes by highlighting those same gender stereotypes.109 Inherent problems in the sex stereotyping approach for
protecting transgender students from discrimination and harassment have led some to favor an approach which equates discrimination on the basis of gender identity with per se discrimination on
the basis of sex.110
2. Gender Identity Equates to Basis of Sex
In Macy v. Holder,111 the EEOC ruled that in the employment
context, “intentional discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on . . . sex’ . . .” under Title VII.112 The EEOC went on
106. See id. at 1317 (“[D]iscrimination against a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it’s described as
being on the basis of sex or gender. . . . We conclude that a government agent
violates the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of sex-based discrimination
when he or she fires a transgender or transsexual employee because of his or her
gender non-conformity.”).
107. See Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender
Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 Harv. J. L. & Gender 423, 437 (2012)
(arguing sex stereotyping reinforces negative stereotypes forcing transgender
plaintiffs to identify with biological sex).
108. See Jackie Barber, Glenn v. Brumby: Extending Protection from Sex-Based Discrimination to Transsexuals in the Eleventh Circuit, 21 Tul. J.L. & Sexuality 169, 176
(2012) (highlighting paradoxical nature of applying gender-stereotyping approach
to proving discrimination on basis of sex).
109. See Devi M. Rao, Gender Identity Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination: Protecting Transgender Students from Bullying and Harassment Using Title IX, 28 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 245, 257 (2013) (discussing how sex-stereotyping approach may
reinforce harmful stereotypes).
110. See id. (highlighting counterproductive nature of sex-stereotyping
approach).
111. Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr.
12, 2012).
112. Id. at *6, *11 (holding discrimination against employee for transgender
status is per se discrimination on basis of sex).
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to state that the term “sex” as contemplated in Title VII “encompasses both sex – that is, the biological differences between men
and women – and gender.”113 Title VII’s treatment of gender and
sex as synonymous is logical because if the only proscribed discrimination actionable via Title VII was discrimination on the basis of
biological sex, then the only recognized, prohibited treatment
would involve an employer’s preference for one sex over the
other.114 The statute’s protections against sexual harassment, for
example, clearly extend beyond what is encompassed merely by a
person’s biological sex and into the realm of cultural and social
conceptions of masculinity and femininity.115 Finally, prior to Bostock, the Eleventh Circuit in Glenn v. Brumby set out a case for why
discriminating against a person because of their status as a transgender person is per se discrimination on the basis of sex.116 In
that case, the court held that “a person is defined as transgender
precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.”117 Therefore, any discrimination
against a transgender person because of their gender-nonconformity is tautologically sex discrimination whether it is on the basis of
sex or gender.118
E. Recent State Legislation Barring Transgender Athletes
As discussed above, Idaho became the first state to ban trans
women and girls from women’s sports leagues in schools and col113. See id. at *5 (quoting Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir.
2000)) (holding under Title VII sex discrimination includes discrimination on basis of gender as well); see also Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir.
2004) (“The Supreme Court made clear that in the context of Title VII, discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimination.”).
114. For further discussion of how Title VII has been extended beyond a narrow reading of the text limited to overt sex discrimination in hiring, see supra note
91 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989)
(holding discrimination for failing to conform to gender-based expectations such
as wearing make-up, jewelry violates Title VII).
116. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he very
acts that define transgender people as transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and behavior.” (quoting Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561,
563 (2007))).
117. See id. (finding discrimination against employee due to transgender status is per se discrimination on basis of sex because transgender status implies disconnect between one’s biological sex, gender presentation, including stereotypes
of how one presents their gender given their biological sex).
118. See Lee, supra note 107, at 437 (providing additional information on per
se approach taken by minority of courts, most notably by Eleventh Circuit in Glenn
v. Brumby).
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leges in March of 2020.119 H.B. 500, or the “Fairness in Women’s
Sports Act,” cites “inherent differences” between men and women
and promoting sex equality as part of its reasoning for barring students of the male sex from athletic teams or sports designated for
females, women, or girls.120 The legislation further states that, if
disputed, a student may establish sex by presenting a signed physician’s statement that shall indicate a student’s sex based solely on
their internal and external reproductive anatomy, the student’s
normal endogenously produced levels of testosterone, and an analysis of the student’s genetic makeup.121 Mississippi followed suit by
passing Senate Bill 2536.122 The Mississippi Fairness Act shares
identical language to the law passed in Idaho.123 Tennessee and
Arkansas legislatures passed laws that require student athletes to
participate in sports teams corresponding with the sex listed on a
student’s birth certificate.124 The laws in Mississippi and Arkansas
apply specifically to “transgender girls, while Tennessee’s bill applies to all transgender youth.”125 In 2021, seventeen states passed
similar legislation, joined by South Dakota in early 2022.126 At the
119. See Minsburg, supra note 46 (describing legislative history surrounding
passage of Idaho law banning trans-women, girls from playing on teams which conform with gender identity).
120. See Hecox v. Little, AM. C. L. UNION (Jan. 14, 2022), https://
www.aclu.org/cases/hecox-v-little [https://perma.cc/M85N-NXUW] (describing
transgender athletes challenge to Idaho law).
121. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-6203(3) (West 2021) (describing methods for
determining student athlete’s gender).
122. See Senate Bill 2536 § 1–7, MISS. LEGISLATURE (2021), http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2021/html/SB/2500-2599/SB2536IN.htm
[https://perma.cc/2CGF-MBW4] (providing official text of bill).
123. See id. § 3(2) (“Athletic teams or sports designated for ‘females,’ ‘women’
or ‘girls’ shall not be open to students of the male sex.”).
124. See Joe Yurcaba, Arkansas Passes Bill to Ban Gender-Affirming Care for Trans
Youth, NBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/
arkansas-passes-bill-ban-gender-affirming-care-trans-youth-n1262412 [https://
perma.cc/AN3D-WE4V] (“The bill is one of two types of legislation being considered in more than two dozen states: measures that ban or restrict access to genderaffirming care for trans minors, and those that ban trans young people from competing in school sports teams of their gender identity.”).
125. See Autumn Rivera, A Look at Shifting Trends in Transgender Athlete Policies,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 11, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
education/a-look-at-shifting-trends-in-transgender-athlete-policies-magazine2021.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ZU2-EGK5] (explaining wave of states implementing bans on transgender athletes after Idaho became first state to pass such
legislation preventing transgender women, girls from participating in high school
or college women’s sports).
126. See Katie Barnes, Young Transgender Athletes Caught in Middle of States’ Debates, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/32115820/
young-transgender-athletes-caught-middle-states-debates [https://perma.cc/PA6RYPRG] (providing review of state level legislation restricting transgender athletes’
participation and high school association policies); see also Kiara Alfonseca, South
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federal level, The Protect Women’s Sports Act, H.R. 8932 (116),
was introduced by former Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii) and Rep.
Markwayne Mullin (R-Okla.) and would prevent students who are
assigned male at birth from participating on girls’ sports teams.127
Schools that don’t comply would be ineligible for federal
funding.128
Athletic eligibility for transgender youth is typically determined not by the state legislature but by states’ high school associations.129 In Louisiana, a student-athlete must compete on teams
consistent with the gender on their birth certificate unless they
have undergone sex reassignment surgery.130 A “hardship committee” then considers cases of those who have undergone sex reassignment surgery, taking into account, among other considerations,
whether the surgical anatomical changes have been completed.131
While some state laws restrict transgender athletes’ participation,
Dakota Signs 1st Anti-Transgender Sports Law of 2022, ABC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2022) (providing background on state laws restricting transgender women, girls from playing
on sports teams conforming with gender identity).
127. See Madeleine Carlisle, Tulsi Gabbard Introduces Bill That Would Ban Trans
Women and Girls from Female Sports, TIME (Dec. 11, 2021), https://time.com/
5920758/tulsi-gabbard-bill-transgender-women-sports/ [https://perma.cc/9HAVX87B] (providing background on Protect Women’s Sports Act including its legislative history).
128. See H.R. 8932, 116th Cong. (2020) (explaining purpose of bill is “to provide that for purposes of determining compliance with title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 in athletics, sex shall be determined on the basis of biological sex as determined at birth by a physician”).
129. For further discussion of individual states’ athletic eligibility criteria, see
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
130. See LA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT, 164 (n.d.),
available at: https://13248aea-16f8-fc0a-cf26-a9339dd2a3f0.filesusr.com/ugd/
2bc3fc_c4403a24e71d4732b89d7162b6e017c7.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6VDGCMS] (providing LHSAA adopts position on Gender Identity Participation as
guideline to help direct member schools, including stating student-athletes should
compete in gender on birth certificate unless they have undergone sex
reassignment).
131. See id. (“A student-athlete who has undergone sex reassignment must go
through the hardship appeal process to become eligible for interscholastic competition. The Hardship Committee shall consider all of the facts of the situation and
shall rule the student-athlete eligible to compete in the reassigned gender when:
1. The student-athlete has undergone sex reassignment before puberty, OR
2. The student-athlete has undergone sex reassignment after puberty under
all of the following conditions: a. Surgical anatomical changes have been completed, including external genitalia changes and gonadectomy. b. All legal recognition of the sex reassignment has been conferred with all the proper governmental
agencies (Driver’s license, voter registration, etc.) c. Hormonal therapy appropriate for the assigned sex has been administered in a verifiable manner and for
sufficient length of time to minimize gender-related advantages in sports competition. d. Athletic eligibility in the reassigned gender can begin no sooner than two
years after all surgical and anatomical changes have been completed.”).
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others, as in Connecticut, specifically allow transgender students to
compete in accordance with their gender identity without requiring
gender affirming surgical interventions prior to participating.132
III. ASSESSING

THE

LIKELIHOOD THAT BANS WILL SUCCEED POSTBOSTOCK

The Supreme Court’s Bostock decision was widely celebrated by
civil rights activists as an expansion of workplace and hiring protections for vulnerable members of the LGBTQ community.133 The
president of the Human Rights Campaign, Alphonso David, referred to it as a “landmark moment in the on-going fight for
LGBTQ equality.”134 Other commentators openly worried that the
decision would undermine religious freedom, freedom of speech,
parents’ right to educate their children in line with their values,
women’s athletics generally, and privacy in bathrooms and locker
rooms.135 Justice Alito in his Bostock dissent raised pointed questions about the decision’s applicability to the world of student ath132. See Kathleen Megan, A Federal Agency Says Connecticut Must Keep Trans Students from Girls’ Sports. The State Disagrees., CT MIRROR (June 15, 2020), https://
ctmirror.org/2020/06/15/a-federal-agency-says-connecticut-must-keep-trans-students-from-girls-sports-the-state-disagrees/ [https://perma.cc/6HTE-FFCG]
(describing actions taken by Connecticut’s Attorney General to halt efforts to deny
or cut funding to state for enforcing policy allowing transgender girls, women to
participate on athletic teams that conform to gender identity).
133. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Civil Rights Law Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020), http://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/15/us/gay-transgender-workers-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/
FW4L-C4JE] (“Supporters of L.G.B.T. rights were elated by the ruling, which they
said was long overdue. ‘This is a simple and profound victory for L.G.B.T. civil
rights,’ said Suzanne B. Goldberg, a law professor at Columbia.”).
134. See Aryn Fields, Human Rights Campaign President Celebrates One-Year Anniversary of Supreme Court Bostock Decision, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 15, 2021),
https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/human-rights-campaign-president-celebratesone-year-anniversary-of-supreme-court-bostock-decision [https://perma.cc/3MSG8JTH] (citing Bostock ruling as victory for LGBTQ equality, calling for passage of
further protections).
135. See, e.g., Melissa Moschella, The Supreme Court Has Imperiled Parents’ Right
to Pass Their Values on to Children, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 29, 2020), https://
www.heritage.org/gender/commentary/the-supreme-court-has-imperiled-parentsright-pass-their-values-children [https://perma.cc/NP76-C9WM] (“Justice Neil
Gorsuch’s majority opinion explicitly declines to address questions about bathrooms, locker rooms, women’s sports, and so on. But the logic of Bostock [sic]
implies that it would violate Title IX, for example, to prevent a student with male
anatomy who identifies as female from changing and showering in the girls’ locker
room or competing on the girls’ track team. . . . [A] growing number of parents
will have no choice but to send their children to an educational environment that
may sow profound confusion about the basic truths of human identity.”).
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letics and whether the Bostock definition of “sex” extends to youth
and college athletics.136
A. Extending Title VII to Title IX
The Court’s decision in Bostock resolved the issue of whether
Title VII protections against sex-based employment discrimination
extend to LGBTQ+ employees.137 The Supreme Court in Bostock
announced that the plain language of the 1964 civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin” also prohibited discrimination based on homosexual or transgender status.138 Perhaps most illuminating, the majority in Bostock concluded that “it is impossible to discriminate
against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”139
The statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination in Title
VII and Title IX are similar, and the Supreme Court and other federal courts have often looked to interpretations of Title VII to inform Title IX analysis.140 Following President Biden’s January 25,
2021 Executive Order, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice issued an additional application of Bostock on March
26, 2021.141 In this application, the Department of Justice asserts
136. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1779 (2020) (“Another
issue that may come up under both Title VII and Title IX is the right of a transgender individual to participate on a sports team or in an athletic competition
previously reserved for members of one biological sex.”).
137. See id. at 1731, 1737 (holding Title VII protections extend to LGBTQ
employees).
138. See id. (holding legislative intent may differ from express terms of statute
but written word of statute is controlling); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2)
(2012) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
139. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (adopting per se discrimination approach).
140. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1090–91 (D. Minn. 2000) (discussing application of Title VII precedent). But see
Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643–45 (1999) (distinguishing
between Title IX versus Title VII with respect to agency).
141. See Memorandum from Principal Deputy Assistant Atty. Gen. Pamela S.
Karlan, Civil Rights Division to Federal Agency Civil Rights Directors and General
Counsels (Mar. 26, 2021), available at: https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/
1383026/download [https://perma.cc/7DCB-369C] (asserting Bostock applies to
Title IX).
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that Title IX’s “on the basis of sex” language has historically been
seen as sufficiently similar to the “because of” sex language in Title
VII such that the two are “interchangeable.”142 Therefore, because
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “because of” sex includes
discrimination because of sexual orientation and transgender status, the same reasoning supports the notion that Title IX’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of” sex also prohibits
discrimination against individuals based on sexual orientation or
transgender status.143 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
directive to “give Title IX . . . a sweep as broad as its language.”144
Similarly, the Department of Education released a Federal Register
Notice of Interpretation on the enforcement of Title IX with respect to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity in light of Bostock on June 16, 2021.145 The Notice of Interpretation laid out several reasons why Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.146 First, it
points to the textual similarity between Title VII and Title IX.147
The Department of Education asserts that, as in Bostock, no ambiguity exists about how to apply the title’s terms to the facts before it.148
The Department also asserts that subsequent case law supports ap142. See id. (citing holdings from Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 75 (1992), Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007), Gossett
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th
Cir. 2001) as evidence of interchangeable nature of “because of sex” versus “on the
basis of sex”).
143. See id. (describing how Title IX protections apply to those whose status is
of transgender student analogous to Title VII’s application to transgender
employee).
144. See N. Haven Bd. Of Ed. V. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (holding broad
language of Title IX encompasses employment discrimination in federally financed education programs).
145. See Making the Roster: Conflicting Title IX Interpretations Present Challenges for
Transgendered Athlete Participation, NAT’L L. REV. (Jun. 25, 2021), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/making-roster-conflicting-title-ix-interpretationspresent-challenges-transgendered [https://perma.cc/3DQP-LW2Z] (explaining
executive actions taken by President Biden on first day in office).
146. See Notice of Interpretation: Enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 with Respect to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity in Light of Bostock v. Clayton County, 86 Fed. Reg. 32640 (Jun. 22, 2021)
(citing textual similarity between Title VII versus Title IX, including additional
case law).
147. See id. at 32638 (“Both statutes prohibit sex discrimination, with Title IX
using the phrase ‘on the basis of sex’ and Title VII using the phrase ‘because of’
sex. The Supreme Court has used these two phrases interchangeably.”).
148. See id. at 32639 (“Numerous Federal courts have relied on Bostock to recognize that Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.”).
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plying the reasoning of Bostock to Title IX.149 Finally, the Department concludes that this interpretation is most consistent with Title
IX’s purpose of ensuring equal opportunity and protecting individuals from the harms of sex discrimination.150
It seems clear – given the arguments put forward by the majority in Bostock and the Biden Administration’s apparent willingness to
extend this decision beyond merely the employment realm – that
Title VII protections are likely to extend beyond employment law
and impact interpretations of Title IX.151 In fact, the Eleventh Circuit already adopted Bostock’s reasoning in Adams v. School Board of
St. Johns County,152 decided only a few weeks after the Bostock decision.153 In that case, the court held that Title IX protects students
from discrimination based on their transgender status and not simply against harassment or discrimination for gender nonconformity.154 Moreover, the court held that the public school board’s
policy prohibiting a transgender boy from accessing the bathroom
consistent with their gender identity “singled him out for different
treatment because of his transgender status” and caused him harm
in violation of Title IX.155 Bostock represented more than a major
legal victory for transgender employees; it sent a symbolic message
of equal treatment and respect moving courts away from the out149. For further discussion of the subsequent case law applying Bostock in the
Title IX setting, see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
150. For further discussion of the Department of Education’s arguments for
applying Bostock to Title IX, see supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151. See John Dayton & Micah Barry, LGBTQ+ Employment Protections: The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia and the Implications for
Public Schools, 35 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 115, 137 (2020) (noting “public educational institutions are commonly a key battleground in legal/culture wars battles,
and the Court’s decisions on these issues generally have significant implications for
public educational institutions” (citations omitted)).
152. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 968 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2020). For
further discussion of the pending Eleventh Circuit appeal, see supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
153. See Adams, 968 F.3d at 1286 (holding school board’s policy violates Title
IX while applying lessons from Bostock). For further discussion of recent circuit
court developments, see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
154. See Adams, 968 F.3d at 1304 (“We conclude that this policy of exclusion
constitutes discrimination. First, Title IX protects students from discrimination
based on their transgender status. And second, the School District treated Mr. Adams differently because he was transgender, and this different treatment caused
him harm. Finally, nothing in Title IX’s regulations or any administrative guidance
on Title IX excuses the School Board’s discriminatory policy.”).
155. See id. at 1307 (“The record leaves no doubt that Mr. Adams suffered
harm from this differential treatment. Mr. Adams introduced expert testimony
that many transgender people experience the ‘debilitating distress and anxiety’ of
gender dysphoria, which is alleviated by using restrooms consistent with their gender identity, among other measures.”).
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dated model which bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes and toward one which recognizes and protects transgender
individuals by labeling discrimination against transgender individuals as per se discrimination on the basis of sex.156 While a victory
for transgender activists and allies, the decision has caused a great
deal of anxiety among those who feel that allowing transgender women and girls to compete with cisgendered women undermines the
initial purpose of Title IX.157
B. How Courts and Legislatures Will Likely Respond to Bostock
With the possible exception of the Eleventh Circuit, circuit
courts throughout the country have thus far consistently held that
Title IX requires schools to treat transgender students consistent
with their gender identity.158 Already we are seeing the effects of
Bostock, with its Title VII reasoning applied in a Title IX context,
and likewise, claims that educational settings are somehow different
than employment settings making Title VII arguments inapplicable
in a Title XI context have also been widely rejected.159
Drafters of legislation barring transgender athletes from participating on teams that conform to their gender identity often point
to the Department of Education’s implementing regulations, which
emphasize the importance of sex-segregated teams and express
fears that transgender athletes jeopardize the very existence of separate teams for men and women.160 This focus misconstrues transgender students’ argument.161 Transgender plaintiffs have not
156. See generally Devon Sherrell, “A Fresh Look”: Title VII’s New Promise for LGBT
Discrimination Protection Post-Hively, 68 Emory L.J. 1101, 1129 (2019) (discussing
strong social signal transmitted by national antidiscrimination legislation).
157. See Abigail Shrier, supra note 15 (arguing transgender athletes may undermine women and girls sports generally).
158. See A.H. v. Minersville Area Sch. Dist., 408 F. Supp. 3d 536, 552 (M.D. Pa.
2019) (discussing recent circuit court decisions finding Title IX protections extend
to transgender students). For further discussion of the current holdings of circuit
courts on treatment of transgender students under Title IX, see supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
159. See Adams by & through Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 968 F.3d
1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020), opinion vacated and superseded, Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St.
Johns Cty., Fla., 3 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, 9 F.4th 1369
(11th Cir. 2021) (“Bostock has great import for Mr. Adams’s Title IX claim. Although Title VII and Title IX are separate substantive provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, both titles prohibit discrimination against individuals on the basis of
sex.”).
160. For further discussion of the potential negative consequences of actions
allowing transgender women and girls to participate on teams that conform to
their gender identity, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
161. See Jack Turban, Trans Girls Belong on Girls’ Sports Teams, SCI. AM. (Mar.
16, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trans-girls-belong-on-girls-
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challenged sex-segregated teams, but rather have challenged laws
that bar them from accessing teams that conform with their gender
identity.162 Moreover, the implementing regulations do not override the statutory prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
sex.163 The regulation is a broad statement that sex-segregated
sports teams are not unlawful, and not that schools may act in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner when dividing students into
those sex-segregated teams.164
Courts have variously held that a transgender student’s “psychological and dignitary harm” caused by a school bathroom policy
is legally cognizable under Title IX.165 This harm provides transgender students who have been barred from participating on teams
that conform to their gender identity with sufficient standing to
bring a Title IX case for discrimination under the act.166 In the
Title IX context, discrimination “mean[s] treating that individual
sports-teams/ [https://perma.cc/592D-ZEHU] (finding there is no scientific or
moral basis for treating transgender girls differently from cisgender girls—therefore policies excluding transgender girls from sports are harmful to girls
generally).
162. See Gloucester County School Board v. G.G - School Administrators from 31
States and the District of Columbia Brief for Amici Curiae, AM. C.L. UNION https://
www.aclu.org/legal-document/gloucester-county-school-board-v-gg-school-administrators-31-states-and-district [https://perma.cc/ZT4S-R984] (last visited Sept. 23,
2021) (“Amici have also addressed the lurking hypothetical concern that permitting individuals to use facilities consistent with their gender identity will lead to the
abolition of gender-specific facilities. Contrary to that ‘slippery slope’ argument,
however, all amici continue to maintain gender-segregated facilities in their
schools. In fact, respecting the gender identity of transgender students reinforces
the concept of separate facilities for girls and boys; requiring a transgender girl to
use the boys’ restroom or a transgender boy to use the girls’ restroom undermines
the notion of gender-specific spaces.”).
163. See e.g., Grimm II, 972 F.3d 586, 618 (4th Cir. 2020) as amended (Aug.
28, 2020), cert. denied, No. 20-1163, 2021 WL 2637992 (June 28, 2021) (“[T]he
implementing regulation cannot override the statutory prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.”).
164. See, e.g., Grimm II, 972 F.3d at 619 n.16 (stating 20 U.S.C. § 1686 is
“broad statement that sex-separated living facilities are not unlawful – not that
schools may act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner when dividing students
into those sex-separated facilities”).
165. See Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1306–07, 1310–11
(11th Cir. 2020) (holding transgender student’s “psychological and dignitary
harm” caused by school bathroom policy was legally cognizable under Title IX).
166. See Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d
1034, 1045–47 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming finding of irreparable harm because excluding transgender student from boys’ restroom “stigmatized” student, caused
him “significant psychological distress”); see also Dodds v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 845
F.3d 217, 221–22 (6th Cir. 2016) (affirming finding of irreparable harm because
excluding young transgender student “from the girls’ restrooms has already had
substantial and immediate adverse effects on [her] daily life[,] . . . health[,] and
well-being”).
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worse than others who are similarly situated.”167 Laws which prevent transgender individuals from playing on teams that conform to
their gender identity treat these athletes worse than students with
whom they are similarly situated because they do not allow transgender athletes to play on teams that correspond with their gender
identity, unlike their non-transgender peers.168 Recent state level
legislation that bars transgender athletes from playing on the teams
consistent with their gender identity is therefore susceptible to challenge and will likely be held to violate Title IX.169 While the Biden
Administration has so far been vocal about its support of transgender students’ access to facilities that conform to their gender
identity, it has been silent on enforcement actions it would take
against noncompliant institutions.170 As in all issues involving federal statutory interpretation, Congress may also resolve the ambiguity of the meaning of “sex” in Title IX by amending the statute or
providing additional legal protections.171
C. Other Avenues to Challenge Anti-Trans State Legislation
(Equal Protection)
While Title IX challenges are the most likely grounds upon
which state legislation banning transgender women and girls from
participating in high school and collegiate sports in accordance
with their gender identity will be overturned, the Fourteenth
Amendment offers a second avenue by which such laws may ulti167. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006)) (finding disparate treatment
based on sex must also be intentional).
168. For further discussion of the benefits of “trans-inclusive” school policies,
see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
169. See Katie Rogers, Title IX Protections Extend to Transgender Students, Education Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/
16/us/politics/title-ix-transgender-students.html [https://perma.cc/DLB42NCD] (citing Education Department officials who claim Title IX protections extend to transgender students, so will likely impact recent state legislation to ban
transgender students from playing sports that correspond with their gender
identity).
170. See id. (providing opinions of some commentators explaining Biden Administration may be reluctant to enforce Executive Order); see also Nikki Hatza et
al., Biden Executive Order Expands Title IX Protections, JDSUPRA (Mar. 10, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/biden-executive-order-expands-title-ix3384512/ [https://perma.cc/ASQ9-BVGX] (providing summary of Biden Administration’s Executive Order on “[g]uaranteeing an Educational Environment Free
from Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Including Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” including its implications for Title IX enforcement).
171. See, e.g., S. 2584, 115th Congress (2018) (providing text of proposed bill
barring identity-based discriminations against students in program or activities receiving federal financial assistance).
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mately be challenged.172 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
“equal protection of the laws.”173 Sex or gender “generally provide
. . . no sensible ground for differential treatment.”174 Therefore,
the Equal Protection Clause allows only “exceedingly persuasive”
classifications based on sex or gender.175
The Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to sexbased classifications in order to eliminate discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes.176 Policies that bar transgender girls and
women from participating in sports broadly discriminate on the basis of sex and thus could be subjected to heightened scrutiny.177
Ostensibly, laws that ban transgender athletes from participating in
high school and collegiate sports are done to promote an important government interest.178 However, there is not a substantial relationship between banning transgender athletes from teams that
conform to their gender identity and promoting sex equality.179
Governmental gender classifications must be “reasonable, not arbi172. See generally Krista D. Brown, The Transgender Student-Athlete: Is There A
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Participate on the Gender-Specific Team of Your Choice?, 25
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 311, 314–16 (2014) (discussing due process arguments,
equal protection arguments against state laws banning transgender athletes from
participating on teams in conformity to gender identity).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating general rule classifications based on gender or sex bear no relation to ability,
gender or sex classifications fail equal protection scrutiny unless substantially related to sufficiently important government interest).
175. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (finding State
must at least show challenged classification serves important governmental objectives, must show discriminatory means employed are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives).
176. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The nature
of the discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and
discrimination on this basis is a form of sex-based discrimination that is subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Ever since the Supreme
Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications, its consistent
purpose has been to eliminate discrimination on the basis of gender
stereotypes.”).
177. See, e.g., Adams ex. Rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 968 F.3d
1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying heightened scrutiny because school board’s
bathroom policy singles out transgender students for differential treatment because they are transgender).
178. For further discussion of justifications used by states that adopted laws
banning transgender athletes, see supra notes 121, 123 and accompanying text.
179. See Krista D. Brown, supra note 172, at 325 (“Under Equal Protection
jurisprudence regarding gender equity in high school athletics, courts have found
that categorically denying underrepresented sexes the opportunity to play on an
athletic team because of health and safety concerns is not substantially related to
that objective.”).
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trary.”180 For example, policies often are administered arbitrarily
by relying on student’s enrollment documents to determine sex assigned at birth and thus do not treat all transgender students
alike.181 Already, various circuit courts have appeared eager to apply equal protection arguments in addition to sex-stereotyping and
per se discrimination arguments post-Bostock to strike down bans on
transgender athletes.182 In Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board,
for example, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that when a school district decides which bathroom a
student may use based upon sex listed on a birth certificate, this is
sex-based discrimination and is subject to intermediate scrutiny.183
Moreover, the court rejected the school board’s argument that privacy interests constitute an “exceedingly persuasive” justification of
the policy.184 Given the trend among circuit courts, including recent decisions of the Eleventh Circuit – seen by many as least likely
to apply Bostock to a Title IX setting – it appears highly unlikely that
state laws restricting the rights of transgender individuals will survive challenges on both Equal Protection and Title IX grounds.185
180. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.’ ” (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920))).
181. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (finding students’ sex on
school enrollment documents not “legitimate, accurate proxy” for sex assigned at
birth).
182. See, e.g., Grimm II, 972 F.3d 586, 620 (4th Cir. 2020) (“The proudest
moments of the federal judiciary have been when we affirm the burgeoning values
of our bright youth, rather than preserve the prejudices of the past. . . . How shallow a promise of equal protection that would not protect Grimm from the fantastical fears and unfounded prejudices of his adult community.”).
183. See id. at 608 (“We agree with the Seventh and now Eleventh Circuits that
when a ‘School District decides which bathroom a student may use based upon the
sex listed on the student’s birth certificate, “the policy necessarily rests on a sex
classification.”’ ” (quoting Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017))); see also Adams ex. rel. Kasper v. Sch.
Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Mr. Adams and the
School Board are in agreement that our Court is required to review the School
District’s bathroom policy with heightened scrutiny. Although this standard of review is not in dispute, we first review why heightened scrutiny is warranted in order
to chart a course for our analysis.”).
184. See Grimm II, 972 F.3d at 623 (Wynn, J. concurring) (“Put simply,
Grimm’s entire outward physical appearance was male. As such, there can be no
dispute that had he used the girls’ restroom, female students would have suffered a
similar, if not greater, intrusion on bodily privacy than that the Board ascribes to
its male students. The Board’s stated privacy interests thus cannot be said to be an
‘exceedingly persuasive’ justification of the policy.”).
185. See generally id. (holding school board policy banning transgender students from using bathroom conforming to gender identity violates Title IX, Equal
Protection Clause protections). See also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321
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D. What this Signifies for Women’s Sports Going Forward
Recently, a federal judge issued a preliminary injunction on
the Idaho law banning transgender women and girls from sports
teams citing Bostock’s reasoning that discrimination against an individual for being transgender necessarily discriminates on the basis
of sex.186 This ruling and others could imply that laws which discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity may
be increasingly subjected to heightened scrutiny analysis going forward.187 Following the Bostock decision, Olympic track-and-field
coach Linda Blade stated that she feared that “all the benefits society gets from letting girls have their protected category so that competition can be fair, all the advances in women’s rights . . . [will] be
diminished.”188 Similar concerns have been echoed in state legislation banning transgender girls and women from school athletics.189
Several bills specifically point out that sex-specific teams promote
sex equality by providing opportunities to female athletes to
“demonstrate their skill, strength and athletic abilities while also
providing them with opportunities to obtain . . . the numerous
other long-term benefits that flow from success in athletic endeavors.”190 Following President Biden’s executive order calling on
agencies across the federal government to review regulations and
policies that prohibit sex discrimination to include sexual orienta(11th Cir. 2011) (“Brumby has advanced no other reason that could qualify as a
governmental purpose, much less an ‘important’ governmental purpose, and even
less than that, a ‘sufficiently important governmental purpose’ that was achieved
by firing Glenn because of her gender non-conformity.”). In applying equal protection logic to striking down a claim of sex-based discrimination in the employment setting, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated its willingness to apply heightened
scrutiny in future cases within the school setting as well. See id. (implying termination of employment due to gender non-conformity would likely not serve sufficiently important governmental purpose).
186. See Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 943 (D. Idaho 2020) (ordering
preliminary injunction on Idaho law).
187. See Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future of LGBTQ Civil Rights, CAP
ACTION (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/beyond-bostock-future-lgbtq-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/366U-6BAS] (describing Bostock’s
impact on Equal Protection Clause as well as impacts on access to housing under
Fair Housing Act, and access to healthcare under Affordable Care Act).
188. For further discussion of critics of Biden Administration’s Executive Action directing all federal agencies to reevaluate treatment of transgender individuals in light of the Bostock decision, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
189. For further discussion of justifications used by states that adopted laws
banning transgender athletes, see supra notes 121, 123 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Senate Bill 2536 § 1–7, MISS. LEGISLATURE (2021), http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2021/html/SB/2500-2599/SB2536IN.htm
[https://perma.cc/5JDZ-SG8X] (citing benefits to male, female students of sexsegregated teams barring transgender individuals from participating on teams conforming with gender identity).
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tion and gender identity per Bostock, the hashtag #BidenErasedWomen trended on Twitter.191 Inherent in this argument,
however, is the idea that what is good for transgender girls and women is not also good for girls and women generally and that transgender girls and women are somehow not part of this larger
group.192
On the other hand, in a joint statement, twenty-three women’s
rights and gender justice organizations voiced their support of the
full inclusion of transgender people in athletics.193 While Linda
Blade’s concerns are by no means unusual, they are likely unfounded.194 Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
had trans-inclusive athletic laws or policies for more than a decade.195 It has also been found that many of these states actually saw
higher participation rates in athletics among cisgender women after such policies were implemented.196 University of Pennsylvania
swimmer Lia Thomas became a central figure in the debate over
transgender inclusion in competitive women’s sports after setting
the fastest women’s time in the nation for the 200 meter free
swim.197 All else being equal, it does appear that transgender women may have a competitive advantage over cisgender female ath191. See Samantha Schmidt et al., Biden Calls for LGBTQ Protection in Day 1
Executive Order, Angering Conservatives, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/01/21/biden-executive-order-transgender-lgbtq/ [https://perma.cc/EP5G-JYFC] (describing backlash to Biden Administrations Executive Order).
192. For further discussion of how arguments in favor of excluding transgender women or girls from school sports are unscientific and unjust, see supra
note 161 and accompanying text.
193. See Statement of Women’s Rights and Gender Justice Organizations in Support of
Full and Equal Access to Participation in Athletics for Transgender People, AM. C.L.
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/letter/statement-womens-rights-and-gender-justiceorganizations-support-full-and-equal-access [https://perma.cc/U2CU-6FC6] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2021) (“We speak from experience and expertise when we say that
nondiscrimination protections for transgender people — including women and
girls who are transgender — are not at odds with women’s equality or well-being,
but advance them.”).
194. See id. (stating equal participation in athletics for transgender people
does not mean end to women’s sports generally).
195. See K-12 Policies, supra note 16 (downplaying recent fears about transgender athletes, citing prior “trans-inclusive” laws).
196. See Statement of Women’s Rights and Gender Justice Organizations, supra note
193 (indicating participation in women’s sports generally increased when transinclusionary laws or policies were adopted).
197. See David Rieder, Controversy of the Year: Transgender Swimmer Lia Thomas
Swims Fastest Times in the Nation, SWIMMING WORLD (Dec. 31, 2021), https://
www.swimmingworldmagazine.com/news/controversy-of-the-year-transgenderswimmer-lia-thomas-swims-fastest-times-in-the-nation/ [https://perma.cc/VJ5LNJMB] (providing background on Lia Thomas, including her college swimming
records).
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letes, and conceivably could lead many women’s sports
competitions if a small percentage of elite athletes transition after
puberty.198 However, competitors like Lia Thomas are extremely
rare and a world in which transgender athletes dominate the upper
echelons of female athletics has not yet materialized—and transgender athletes in general remain quite rare.199 The likeliest result
of the Bostock case is that transgender girls and women who are currently barred or discouraged from high school and collegiate athletics will be able to participate, thus avoiding the potential
psychological harms that come about from denying such
participation.200
IV. CONCLUSION: BEYOND BOSTOCK

AND

INTO

THE

FUTURE

The Bostock decision will inevitably be an incredibly important
development in protections for LGBTQ individuals in the employment sphere.201 Moreover, as federal courts continue to expand
the Bostock decision into other realms, it will continue to afford
transgender individuals additional protections.202 One such protection will likely include transgender athletes’ ability to play on
198. See Megan McArdle, We Need To Be Able To Talk About Trans Athletes and
Women’s Sports, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/2022/01/13/trans-women-sports-uncomfortable-questions/ [https://
perma.cc/Z483-S4QP] (discussing Lia Thomas, other transgender athletes’, potential competitive edge over cisgender athletes).
199. See David Crary & Lindsay Whitehurst, Lawmakers Can’t Cite Local Examples
of Trans Girls in Sports, AP NEWS (Mar. 3, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/
lawmakers-unable-to-cite-local-trans-girls-sports914a982545e943ecc1e265e8c41042e7 [https://perma.cc/Y6H3-KRYL] (highlighting inability of legislators advocating bans on transgender girls competing on girls’
sports teams to cite examples of transgender athletes compromising ability of cisgender girls to participate); see also Jo Yurcaba, Amid Trans Athlete Debate, Penn’s Lia
Thomas Loses to Trans Yale Swimmer, ABC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2022), https://
www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-news/trans-athlete-debate-penns-lia-thomas-losestrans-yale-swimmer-rcna11622 [https://perma.cc/UE7R-WNAC] (citing underrepresentation of transgender athletes in NCAA compared to general population
while reporting Lia Thomas recently lost to male transgender athlete who competes on women’s team because he has not begun gender-affirming hormone
treatment).
200. See, e.g., Grimm I, 822 F.3d 709, 727–28 (4th Cir. 2016) (Davis, J., concurring) (citing expert declaration by psychologist specializing in working with children, adolescents, with gender dysphoria, who stated treating transgender boy as
male in some situations but not in others is “inconsistent with evidence-based medical practice and detrimental to the health and well-being of the child”).
201. For further discussion of the impact of the Bostock decision in the employment field, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
202. For further discussion of the impact of Bostock beyond employment, see
supra notes 128–140 and accompanying text.
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sports teams that conform to their gender identity in high school
and collegiate athletics.203
At the same time, as transgender athletes increasingly compete
on teams that conform to their gender identity, there will be those
who oppose the change and claim that this represents a violation of
Title IX protections of cisgendered women.204 Ultimately, it will
fall upon either the courts, federal agencies, and Congress to further clarify the meaning of sex in Title IX.205 While there are some
who fear that these new rights will come at the expense of rights
enjoyed by cisgender female athletes, these fears are likely
unfounded.206
Joe Brucker*
203. For further discussion of why Bostock may eventually extend to school
athletics, see supra notes 150–164 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Soule v. Conn. Assn. of Schs., No. 3:20–cv–00201, 2021 WL
1617206, at *1 (D. Conn., Apr. 17, 2020) (challenging Connecticut’s law allowing
transgender athletes to compete on teams corresponding with gender identity as
violating Title IX protections for cisgender female athletes).
205. See Title IX: Who Determines the Legal Meaning of “Sex”?, CONG. RSCH. SERV.
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10229
[https://perma.cc/7LV7-4SKC] (delineating roles played by courts, Congress, federal agencies in interpreting Title IX).
206. For further discussion of the impact of Bostock’s protection expanding to
Title IX on women’s sports, see supra notes 188–200 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; I would like to thank my family and friends for all their encouragement and
support throughout my academic and professional endeavors.
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